BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY INVOLVING
FULL DIRECTOR KNOWLEDGE HELD 10b-5
VIOLATION

IN

Sehoenbaum v. Firstbrook' the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, sitting en banc, has ruled that a plaintiff bringing a
derivative suit states a cause of action under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 19342 and rule lOb-5 3 when the
complaint alleges a conspiracy between the corporation's entire
board of directors and the controlling stockholder to sell treasury
stock to the controlling stockholder at less than what all of the
corporation's directors know to be the shares' true value. The court
further held that summary judgment should not be granted for the
defendants in such an action without at least allowing the plaintiff
to utilize discovery procedures since otherwise the plaintiff will be
unable to rebut the defendants' affidavits denying conspiracy based
on facts exclusively within the defendants' possession. In early 1964,
Aquitaine Company, a "subsidiary" of a French governmental
agency, 4 acquired control of Banff Oil Ltd., a Canadian corporation
whose stock is registered with the SEC and traded on both the American and the Toronto Stock Exchanges. In October of the same year
Aquitaine and Banff agreed to carry out joint oil explorations on a
large tract of land in the Rainbow Lake area of Alberta, Canada
On December 11, 1964, Banff's board of directors, the three
Aquitaine representatives abstaining, voted to sell 500,000 shares of
Banff treasury stock to Aquitaine at the current market price.
Shortly thereafter Aquitaine accepted Banff's offer, although actual
delivery of the stock did not take place until March 16, 1965.
'405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968).

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
317C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
Aquitaine is a wholly owned subsidiary of Societe National des Petroles d'Aquitaine, a

French corporation which is in turn a subsidiary of Enterprises for Research and Activities
in Petroleum, a French governmental oil agency. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200,
204 (2d Cir. 1968).
5 Banff and Aquitaine obtained a 50%, interest in 160,000 acres of oil land in the Rainbow
Lake area from Socony Mobil in exchange for their promise to pay the total cost of drilling
two exploratory wells. Oil exploration had been carried on in the area before but had proven
unfruitful-at least sixteen unsuccessful exploratory wells had been drilled previous to the

Banff-Aquitaine attempt. Id.
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Exploration in the Rainbow area began in late 1964 and the first
test well flowed in early 1965. Sometime subsequent to the
discovery of the oil, Banff issued a press release disclosing its
exploration activity, but, pursuant to Alberta law, Banff withheld
information concerning the extent of the discovery to reduce
competition from other companies ini bidding on governmental oil
lands in the discovery area.6 Further exploration disclosed that the
oil find was extensive and that it would be necessary to build a
pipeline into the area. In September 1965 Banff directors voted to
negotiate the sale of 270,000 shares of treasury stock in order to
finance its share of the pipeline construction cost. Paribas
Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of a French banking
institution,7 made a written offer on November 22, 1965, to
purchase the shares at the then prevailing market price. Banff
accepted the offer and delivery took place January 24, 1966. It was
not until March 16, 1966. that full disclosure was made as to the
extent of Banff's oil discovery. An American shareholder of Banff
brought a derivative suit against Aquitaine, Paribas and the Banff
directors, alleging that the defendants had conspired to defraud
Banff by causing the corporation to sell treasury shares for an
inadequate consideration.8 The defendants moved for summary
judgment and submitted affidavits categorically denying the
existence of any conspiracy. While rejecting the defendant's claims
that at the time of the transaction they did not know of the oil
discovery,' the trial court felt that under rule 56(e) of the Federal
6 Plaintiff conceded that the defendants were not in violation of any securities laws or in
breach of their fiduciary duty in withholding the information as to the extent of Banff's oil
discovery. Id. at 213 n.10.
I Paribas Corporation is a Delaware corporation doing business in New York and is a
wholly owned subsidiary of Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, a French banking institution.
Paribas negotiated the purchase of Banff's stock on behalf of another subsidiary of Banque
de Paris. Id. at 205.
9The Banff-Aquitaine transaction involved the payment by Aquitaine of $1.35 per
share-the closing price of Banff common stock on the Toronto Stock Exchange on
December II, 1964. The Banff-Paribas transaction involved the payment by Paribas of S7.30
per share-the Toronto price of Banff common stock on November 22, 1965. Banff common
stock traded at prices ranging as high as $18 per share in 1966 after the public disclosure of
the oil discovery. Id. at 205 & n.1.
I In his dissent to the en banc opinion, Judge Medina pointed out that the district court's
rejection of defendants' claims that they did not know of the oil discovery at the time of the
Banff-Aquitaine transaction was not based on any factual finding by the district court.
Rather the lower court judge had assumed arguendo, in making his ruling on the defendants'
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Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff's allegation of conspiracy was
overcome by the defendants' denial supported by affidavits, since
the plaintiff's allegations were not buttressed by an affidavit made
on his own personal knowledge. 0 Therefore, after denying the
plaintiff's request to carry out a program of discovery, the district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the grounds
that (I) the court did not have jurisdiction, and (2) the plaintiff's
complaint, absent the conspiracy allegation which was nullified by
the failure to properly respond under rule 56(e) to the defendants'
affidavits, did not state a claim under section 10(b). In a threejudge panel opinion the Second Circuit disagreed with the district
court as to the jurisdictional question," but affirmed the decision
because of the rule 56(e) determindtion.12 A petition for rehearing
en bane was granted in order to reconsider whether the defendants
were entitled to summary judgment under rule 56. The Second
Circuit en bane affirmed the lower court's granting of summary
judgment only as to the Paribas Corporation, reversing as to all
other defendants,' 3 and remanding to the district court for discovery
motion for summary judgment, that the plaintiffs action must fail even if the defendants.
had known of the oil discovery. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 394 & n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). The en banc dissenter felt that this "contrary-to-fact" assumption had
colored the entire case. 405 F.2d at 220. (Medina, J., dissenting).
10268 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (when motion for
summary judgment is supported by affidavit, adverse party may not rest on his pleadings but
must respond by affidavit on personal knowledge, showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial).
1, Plaintiff predicated subject matter jurisdiction upon section 27 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964) gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
over all "'actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or
the rules and regulations thereunder." The district court conceded that the Securities
Exchange Act had no extraterritorial application and that, gince all of the transactions
complained of took place in Canada. the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. 268
F.Supp. at 391-94. In reversing the lower court's ruling, the panel court looked to the fact that
Banff was registered with the SEC and that its stock was sold on the American Stock
Exchange. The court ruled that the act did have extraterritorial application because the act
was intended to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on
American exchanges. Noting that acts consummated outside the territory of the United
States but having a detrimental affect on American exchanges are of legitimate concern to
the United States, the court cited Strassheim v. Dailey, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (191 1), where the
Supreme Court stated: "Acts done outside ajurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it. justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if [the
actor] had been present at the [time of the detrimental] effect, if the state should succeed in
getting him within its power." 405 F.2d at 206. The en banc court adopted the panel court's
jurisdictional ruling. 405 F.2d a.t 217.
12405 F.2d at 209-10.

13Id. at 217.
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proceedings. The court thereby at least implied that if evidence

could be"obtained to support the allegations of a conspiracy, a lOb5 derivative claim could be sustained even though Jl0 director

knowledge was involved.
Rule lOb-5 makes it unlawful for any person to employ any
artifice, scheme, or device to defraud; to state, or to fail to state,

any material fact which, with regard to the surrounding
circumstances, would be misleading; or to participate "in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security."' 4 Although the rule does not expressly
provide for civil liability, since Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,5

the courts have held that civil redress is available to a defrauded
claimant. Further, lOb-5 claimants have not been subjected to a
rigid adherence to the common law elements of fraud."E Courts, to
varying degrees, have modified or abandoned such traditional fraud
requirements as privity,17 scienter 18 and reliance." The application
of lOb-5 to shareholder derivative suits, however, has created
difficulties in devising a consistent rationale for determining the
circumstances under which a breach of fiduciary duty by corporate
insiders will be considered within the ambit of rule lOb-5.21'
1417 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
I 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), modified, 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.). htodified, 83 F.
Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
"See. e.g., Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965).
'T See Cochran v. Channing Corp.. 211 F. Supp. 239, 243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See
generally Comment, Civil Liability under Section lOB and Rule IOB-5: A Suggestion Jor
Replacing the Doctrine of Privit.v, 74 YALE L.J. 658 (1965).
"See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v.
Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub non.
Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962) (scienter not
required). But see Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965): Trussell v.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964) (scienter required); cj. Dack v.
Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See generally Note, Proo/ o Scienter
Necessarr in a Private Suit Under SEC" Anti-Fraud Rule lOb-5, 63 Micii. L. REV. 1070

(1965).
In a section II-type action brought under lOb-5 it is arguably more reasonable to require
scienter, since otherwise section I I coverage would merely be duplicated without the same
procedural limitations.
"See. e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Ruder, Civil
Liability Under Rule lob-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?. 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627,

678 (1963).
" See generally Note, Fiduciary Suits Under Rule lob-5, 1968 DUKE L.J. 791.
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The confusion surrounding the application of lOb-5 to
derivative actions has roots in two Second Circuit decisions
promulgated within the same month. In O'Neill v. Maytag2 l
wherein the plaintiff alleged that the corporate directors, in an
effort to maintain their control, negotiated an exchange of stocks
with another corporation at an unfavorable ratio, the court stated
that, since all of the directors of both corporations involved in the
transaction had full knowledge of the unfair exchange, there was no
element of deceit which could give rise to a lOb-5 violation. The
court relied upon the holding of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.2
to the effect that lOb-5 does not apply to "fraudulent
mismanagement of corporate affairs ' 23 but only to actual fraud
associated with the sale or purchase of securities. 24 The deceit
requirement in Maytag is difficult to reconcile with the court's
earlier dicta in Ruckle v. Roto American Corp.,2 stating that even
if all directors of the corporation had been informed of a stock
issuance at less than fair value, the corporation could still be
considered the victim of fraud under rule lOb-5. 21 Although
decisions which followed Maytag and Ruckle seemed to pursue
somewhat divergent paths, the liberal Ruckle dicta was
subsequently expanded in A.T. Brod & Co. v. PerlovP and Vine v.
Beneficial Finance Corp.28 In both Brod and Vine the Second
Circuit, without explicitly identifying any element of deceit,
construed lOb-5 to prohibit all "'fraudulent schemes" in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities. 29 The Second Circuit's
failure to articulate an explicit fraud test recently led a district
court in Entel v. Allen"0 to assert that Vine and Brod could be
interpreted as extending the purview of lOb-5 to an undisclosed
breach of state law fiduciary duty.
In the Schoenbaum panel decision3 1 the Second Circuit
22

339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).

2

193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).

2

339 F.2d at 768.

ulId.
21339 F.2d 24
2 Id. at 29.

(2d Cir. 1964).

21375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).

" 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
2 375 F.2d at 397; 374 F.2d at 635.
31270 F. Supp. 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), noted in 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 978 (1967).

*1405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
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majority, after reiterating the Maytag rule that deceit is
prerequisite to a lOb-5 violation, reasserted and clarified the Ruckle
dicta that a corporation may be deceived by its entire board of
directors. Whereas Ruckle only alluded to the possibility of such a
deceptive transaction,32' the Schoenbauni court stated unequivocally:
[A] corporation may be defrauded [in violation of rule lOb-5] ...
even when all of its directors know all of the material facts, if the
conflict between the interests of one or more of the directors and
the interests of the corporation prevents the effective transmission
of material information to the corporation . . .

The majority of the Schoenbaum panel court, however, felt itself
precluded from finding a conflict of interest between Banff and its
directors because of the plaintiff's failure to respond properly to the
defendants' affidavits which categorically denied the existence of
any such conspiracy. Thus, the plaintiff's procedural failing
resulted in a complaint effectively alleging merely '"arm's length
transactions" ' in which the non-interested directors had conveyed
treasury shares at less than their true value. Since the court found
that the affidavits conclusively established that the directors did not
conspire with the purchasers, there was no adverse interest on the
part of the Banff directors which would prevent their knowledge
from being imputed to the corporation. The dissenter in
Schoenbaum, desiring an interpretation of lOb-5 fraud which would
encompass stock transactions in which the directors deceive the
shareholders, stated that the majority's appellation of "arm's
length transactions" to the stock sales was unrealistic since the
abstention of the Aquitaine directors amounted to nothing more
than an "empty ceremonial.""' Implicit in the dissenter's rationale
is the desire to expand the "fraudulent scheme'" test of Vine and
Brod"6 to include traditional breaches of fiduciary duty in securities
transactions.
In deciding the merits of Schoenbaum, the en banc court
employed a two-step analysis by first considering the summary
u 339 F.2d at 29.
=405 F.2d at 211-12.

MId. at 211.
'

I at 215 n.2.
ld.
See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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judgment ruling of the lower court and then turning its attention to
the question of whether a triable claim was stated under rule 1Ob-5.

On the summary judgment issue, the Second Circuit majority
reversed the district court's ruling for the directors of Banff and

Aquitaine and remanded the case with the order that the plaintiff
be allowed to use discovery procedures in order to bolster his

conspiracy allegations

7

Stating that summary judgment should

rarely be granted against a plaintiff in a stockholder's derivative
action unless the plaintiff has been allowed discovery, the court's

main consideration was that in a case of an alleged conspiracy, the
facts are exclusively in the possession of the defendants, effectively

foreclosing the plaintiff's opportunity to counteract the defendants'

affidavits if discovery is denied. 38 The court further stated that

where, as here, the case involves issues as to the knowledge, intent
and motive of the defendants, a full trial might be required in order
to give the trier of fact an opportunity to observe the demeanor of

the witnesses

9

Assuming that plaintiff might substantiate his conspiracy
405 F.2d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1968). In Schoenbaum the plaintiff's response to defendants'
affidavits in support of their summary judgment motion consisted of only an affidavit by his
attorney- a response clearly insufficient under rule 56(e). See note 10 supra. Frequently,
however, a plaintiff will be unable to state that he has personal knowledge of the conspiracy;
he will only know those facts which lead him to believe that there was a conspiracy.
Therefore, when a "Schoenbauni" plaintiff is confronted with defense affidavits supporting a
motion for summary judgment, he should proceed under rule 56(f), which permits the party
opposing summary judgment to set forth reasons why he is unable to present evidentiary
affidavits justifying his opposition. See generally 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
56.24,
at 2871 (2d ed. 1966). Although a genuine issue of the defense affidavits' credibility is not
raised by a mere showing that the affiants are interested in the outcome of the litigation, see,
e.g., Note, Summary Judgment Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56-A Need Jbr a
Clarijying Amendment, 48 IowA L. REv. 453, 462-63 (1963), it would seem that
Schoenbaum could have effectively challenged the affiant's credibility by forcefully
illuminating the allegations of his original complaint.
'3See. e.g., Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883 (1955);
Colby v. Kune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949); Fogelson v. Am. Woolen Co., 170 F.2d
660 (2d Cir. 1948). See also 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
56.17[60], at 2675 (2d ed.
1966).
See, e.g., Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753, 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883
(1955). See also Poller v. CBS, 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) ("We believe that summary
procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent
play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile
witnesses thicken the plot."); Cross v. United States, 336 F.2d 431, 434 (2d Cir. 1964);
Alvado v. Gen. Motors Corp., 229 F.2d 408, 411-12 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
983 (1956).

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1969: 383

allegations by his program of discovery, the en banc court next
considered the issue of whether a claim had been stated under rule
lOb-5. The court ruled that, as to Paribas, the plaintiff had failed
to allege any such violation. 0 In affirming the lower court's
dismissal of Paribas, the en banc court ascribed significance to the
plaintiff's failure to allege (1) that *Paribas was in possession of
information not available to Banff and (2) that Paribas was in a
position, through ownership of stock or otherwise,4 to conspire
with or influence the judgment of the Banff directors by any
improper means. The plaintiff's failure to show any connection
between the Banff directors and Paribas resulted in the court's
acceptance of the transaction as being negotiated at arm's length.
In finding that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state a
claim under lOb-5 as against Aquitaine and Banff's directors,
however, the court restated the Ruckle dicta that "a majority or
even the entire board of directors may be held to have defrauded
their corporation." 4 Whereas the Schoenbaum panel court utilized
an imputed-knowledge test under which the directors' knowledge is
not imputed to the "deceived" corporation in situations where the
entire board has an interest adverse to that of the corporation, 3 the
en banc court saw no need to articulate such a complex rationale
for explaining how a corporation could be deceived by all of its
managing agents. The lOb-5 violation was found in that.Aquitaine,
the controlling stockholder, caused treasury stock to be sold to it
for an inadequate consideration, clearly a traditional breach of
fiduciary duty. Such use of controlling influence, if proven, would
be found to constitute a violation of subdivision (3) of lOb-5
because Aquitaine engaged in an "act, practice or course of
business which operate[s] or would operate as fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security." 44
An additional basis45 for the imposition of liability was the
U405 F.2d at 219.
"See note 53 infra.
405 F.2d at 219.
Id. at 211-14.
U 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (1964).

"In turning its attention to Pappas, the en banc majority stated: *Moreover, Aquitaine
and the directors of Banff were guilty of deceiving the stockholders of Banff (other than
Aquitaine)." 405 F.2d at 220 (emphasis added). The use of the word "moreover" would

seem to indicate that the court was announcing an additionalbasis for subjecting Aquitaine
to possible IOb-5 liability.
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court's finding that the defendants were guilty of deceiving the
stockholders of Banff under the Pappas v. Moss 6 rationale. Pappas

involved a stockholder derivative action against majority
stockholders who, in their capacity as sole directors, voted to sell to
tliemselves a large block of authorized but unissued stock at less
than its current market value. The Third Circuit, in granting lOb-5
relief, found the requisite deceit
by viewing this fraud as though the 'independent' stockholders were

standing in the place of the defrauded corporate entity at the time
the original resolution authorizing the stock sales was passed.47
Since for most state law purposes, corporate directors, as agents of
the corporation, are considered to be the corporation, their
knowledge is imputed to the corporation.' Following this rationale
to its logical conclusion, therefore, would mean that the directors'
knowledge of their breach of fiduciary duty would be imputed to
the corporation and consequently there could be no deception of the
corporation by its directors for merely failing to reveal their
breaches of duty. The Schoenbaum court's substitution of the
stockholders for the corporate entity would seem to solve this
conceptual problem; failure to reveal a breach of fiduciary duty to
the stockholders in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities would constitute the requisite material omission for lOb-5
violation.'
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE

Schoenbaum DECISION

Although the Schoenbaum majority cites the Ruckle dicta that
a corporation may be "deceived" by its entire board of directors,
the court's ruling as to the potential liability of Aquitaine and the
Banff directors would seem to effectively eliminate the corporatedeception requirement in cases involving the purchase or sale of a
coporation's securities by its directors when the beneficiary of the
transaction is in a position to influence the directors. By allowing
the plaintiff in Schoenbaum to pursue his derivative action at least
through the discovery stage-and perhaps through trial-on the
- 393 F.2d 865 (1968).

4 Id. at 869 (emphasis added).
"13 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 790, 819 (perm. ed. 1965); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 282(1)(1958).

"' See note 57 infra and accoiipanying text.
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strength of allegations amounting to mere circumstantial evidence
that the defendants might have been' influenced to act against the
corporation in approving a sale of stock for.inadequate
consideration, the Second, Circuit would seem to be diluting the
"deceit" requirement of lOb-5 to the point of abandonment." The
plaintiff's allegation of facts amounting to a breach of fiduciary
duty coupled with the fact that the beneficiary of the directors'
wrongdoings was in a position to influence the directors was
sufficient to carry the conspiracy claim to the discovery stage,
despite the plaintiff's inability to rebutt the defendants' summary
judgments affidavits of denial. The dissenting judges in
Schoenbaum criticize the majority's ruling on the grounds that
allowing such relief under lOb-5 would be an open invitation for
owners of a few shares of stock to give full rein to their
imaginations in bringing harassment suits against corporate
directors. 5 ' Although the. fear of such suits is of valid judicial
concern, this apprehension would seem to be more than
counterbalanced by the possibility of dwarfing the policy of lOb5-the protection of the investing public.52 The Schoenbaum
majority's granting "of discovery evidences the court's concern that,
given a factual situation like that alleged by the Schoenbaum
plaintiff, it would better serve the policy of lOb-5 to allow him to
explore the possibility of a scheme to defraud than -to cut off
actions by such plaintiffs for fear of the blackmail problems of
strike suits.
The Second Circuit, however, has not abandoned altogether the
Birnbaum-Maytag corporate-deception requirement. In dismissing
Paribas as a defendant and in failing to discuss the liability of the
Banff directors in connection with the sale of treasury stock to
Paribas, the Second Circuit was seemingly requiring that the
-' In finding "fraud" without deceit the Schoenbaun court was no doubt considering the
special type of "equitable fraud" arising from breaches of trust by fiduciaries. See SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). Clause (c) of lOb-5 which makes
unlawful the commission of acts which operate "as a fraud or deceit" suggests that fraud
without the common law element of deceit is also proscribed. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(emphasis added).
.1 405 F.2d at 221.
52Presidential Message, S. REP. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1934); see Cooper v.
North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); New Park Mining Co. v.
Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Pettit v. Am. Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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plaintiff allege more than a simple breach of fiduciary duty in order
to impose lOb-5 liability, at least on the beneficiary of the

transaction.l Whereas the court was willing to allow the plaintiff
to pursue his action beyond the summary judgment stage when he
was able to allege a stock transaction benefiting a party in a

position to influence the directors such as the majority shareholder,
the Schoenbaum majority was unwilling to allow the same relief

against a purchaser where the plaintiff could allege only a breach of
fiduciary duty unconnected with any facts suggesting a conspiracy
or undue influence of the corporate fiduciaries by the recipient of

the stock. The plaintiff failed to state a ground for lOb-5 relief as
to the Paribas transaction by his failure to allege facts which

tended to show that Paribas, through ownership of stock or
otherwise, 54 was able to bring pressure on Banff directors to sell the

corporation's stock for less than adequate consideration. In the
absence of such an allegation, the plaintiff is not entitled to subject
the defendant purchaser to the expense of discovery procedures and

the plaintiff must seek any redress due him by an action under state
law against the corporate directors for their waste of corporate

assets

s

The Second Circuit would seem to be adhering to a test for

gauging lOb-5 applicability against the purchaser which requires

not only an allegation of a breach of duty by corporate fiduciaries
but also an allegation of at least circumstantial evidence that the
transaction resulted from a conspiracy or was negotiated at less
4 The dismissal of Paribas clearly indicates that the Second Circuit was requiring more
than the allegation of a mere breach of fiduciary duty in order to impose lOb-5 liability on
an outside benejiciary of the breach. The court's failure to discuss the potential lOb-5
liability of the corporate directors in connection with the Paribas transaction, however, is not
to be taken as a clear indication that the court was exonerating the directors. Because of the
court's ruling as to the corporate officers and Aquitaine, it is possible that these defendants
might face discovery as to their activity and motivation in the Paribas transaction upon
remand to the lower court. Under the Entel v. Allen test, see note 30 supra and
accompanying text, the trial court might very well impose lOb-5 liability on the corporate
directors in connection with their unrevealed breach of state law fiduciary duty in the sale of
treasury stock to Paribas.
3'The court gives no indication of what type of activity would come within the "or
otherwise" language. Presumably the court is alluding to any activity-i.e.. bribery or blackmail- that might be used to gain an overbearing influence on the corporate fiduciaries.
31For an examination of the various remedies available under state blue-sky law, see L.
CoWETT. BLUE SKY LAW 129-71 (1958); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION
Loss & 1-.
1631-1682 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1962). For an examination of common law remedies, see A.
BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FItAUD-SEC RULE lOb-5, § 2.7(l), at 55 (1968).
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than arm's length. 6 The Entel v. Allen57 conclusion that l0b-5 now
is applicable to all undisclosed brea6hes of state law fiduciary duty,
therefore, would seem to be overbroad,5 s and lOb-5 must still be
interpreted as not applying as against purchasers to those breaches
of duty by corporate fiduciaries where the transaction in securities
has been negotiated at arm's lengthyP
The Second Circuit's citation of Pappas v. Moss o with its
theory of corporate-deception by substitution of the stockholders
for the corporate entity, however, does raise the question of how
this fictional device will be applied in future lOb-5 cases."' By
finding deceit in the directors' failure to disclose their breach of
fiduciary duty to the stockholders, the Pappas rationale could be
applied to situations like the Paribas transaction as well as to the
Aquitaine transaction.6 2 Admittedly Pappas was cited by the
Schoenbaum court only as an additionalground for the imposition
"In requiring the allegation of mote than a breach of fiduciary duty in order to subject an
outside purchaser to lOb-5 liability, the Second Circuit would seem to be turning to a
scientertest in determining lob-5 culpability. The common law deceit requirement of scienter
has not been applied uniformly to lob-5 situations. See note 18 supra and accompanying
text. The cases which have discussed the scienter requirement in relation to lob-5 actions
against corporate officers have varied in their outcome. Compare, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291
F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961) (no scienter required) with Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F.
Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (scienter required). Whereas there would seem to be legitimate
reasons to abandon the scienter requirement as to corporate insiders, see Note, Fiduciary
Suits Under Rule lOb-5, 1968 DUKE L.J. 791, 804,.the requirement that the lob-5 plaintiff at
least allege circumstantial evidence of an outsider's scienter would be a means of limiting
lob-5 actions against potential defendants who do not occupy a position from which to take
advantage of the corporation.
0 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
0 It could be argued that Entel recognized the necessity for some conspiracy or conflict of
interest since, under traditional theories of imputed knowledge, breaches of duty involving
such conflicts would be "undisclosed," and therefore subject to lob-5 liability. See note 30
supra and accompanying text. This same rationale could be used under the Schoenbaum rule
in the suit against the corporate directors.
11Liability of the directors for such breaches might still be maintained, since it is unclear
how the Schoenbaum court will deal with the directors as to the Paribas transaction. It may
be that a Paribas-type defendant, even if not conspiring or exercising undue influence, would
be held liable for knowingly participating in the breach.
393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968).
Li See Note, Rule lob-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases: Who Must Deceive Who? 63
Nw. U.L. REv. 477, 492 (1968), for an analysis of the Pappas ruling and the implications of
its fictional theory of corporate deception.
,1 The limitation of liability, under the Schoenbaum rationale, to cases involving
unrevealed breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with the fiduciaries' purchase or sale of
the managed corporation's securities would seem to be necessitated, absent a situation
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of liability on Aquitaine and the Banff directors 3 However, unless
future decisions limit the Pappas ruling to situations in which the
beneficiary of an undisclosed breach of duty is in a position to
conspire with or influence directors, then the shareholder
substitution theory could itself be used to establish lOb-5 liability
whenever there is a breach of state law fiduciary duty undisclosed
to shareholders. If the courts must resort to fictionalized theories of
corporate deception, it would seem that the panel court's theory of
imputed knowledge with the adverse interest exception could better
be used to limit lOb-5 actions to those cases involving something
more than mere breach of fiduciary duty. Whereas, under Pappas,
the stockholders theoretically would be deceived whenever the
directors concealed their breach of fiduciary duty, the imputed
knowledge test could be used to impute the directors' knowledge of
their breach of duty to the corporation unless the plaintiff could
allege (1) that the directors acted out of a conflict of interest or (2)
that, because of the position of influence occupied by the
beneficiary of the transaction, there is a strong possibility that the
transaction was not negotiated at arm's length. It should be noted,
however, that any fictional theory of deception can constitute a
"trap for the unwary."" Therefore, it probably would be best to
abandon the use of such fictions and either to admit that lob-5 will
be. applied against purchasers in situations involving traditional
requiring stockholder approval, by the traditional rule that corporate directors have no duty
to make the corporation's everyday stock transactions known to the stockholders. See R.
BAKER & W. CARY, CORPORATIONS 94, 266, 531 (3d ed. 1959); Note, Fiduciary Suits
Under Rule lOb-5, 1968 DUKE L.J. 791, 814 & n.108. Many corporations today hold stock
in other corporations; these holdings are usually investment stocks and do not represent a
controlling interest in the other corporations. If the directors were to vote to purchase or sell
such stock holdings, it is doubtful whether the Schoenbaum rationale could be used to
impose liability on them for any breach of fiduciary duty connected with such a transaction.
The breach of fiduciary duty situation, however, might be interpreted by subsequent courts as
coming within the "special circumstances doctrine" of Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419
(1909). The Repide court ruled that under "special circumstances" the directors owe a duty
of revelation directly to the stockholders. If the courts were to adopt the view that a breach
of fiduciary duty in connection with any stock transaction carried on by them constituted
such a :'special circumstance" that the directors owed it to the stockholders to reveal their
activities, then, for all practical purposes, the scope of 10b-5 would be extended to cover all
transactions in which the directors breached their fiduciary duty since corporate fiduciaries
are very unlikely to reveal their breaches of duty to the stockholders.
See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
405 F.2d at 215.
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breaches of fiduciary duty 5 or to limit the Schoenbaum ruling to
permit lOb-5 fiduciary claims to go to the discovery stage only
when the beneficiary of the transaction is in a position to conspire
with or influence the fiduciary. Depending upon the results of
discovery and the evidence otherwise accumulated, the court should
also consider allowing a full trial in *order to evaluate the evidence
of the defendants if, ultimately, it is their credibility that is on trial,

The Schoenbaum panel dissenter stated: "What we have here then i5 a scheme by which
the directors of Banff gave to the controlling stockholder . . . some millions or dollars worth
of the corporation's property. A plainer case ojfrjaud would be hard to find." 405 F.2d at
215 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Schoenbauni dissenter was plainly advocating
the extension of lOb-5 to cover situations involving mere breach of fiduciary duty.

